RSA Shocker (Not): Symantec Admits Traditional Signature Based Tools are “Not Keeping Up”

March 9, 2010

“Traditional signature-based approaches to security are not keeping up.  What we’ve had to do is come up with a new approach. The idea is it has to be able to deal with attacks that we’ve never seen.”

Words from some maverick security company?  Hardly.  These are the words of Symantec CEO’s Enrique Salem from his Tuesday RSA Conference keynote.  And he is about to tell the assembled RSA crowd that Symantec’s prevalence technology is the answer to the vexing problem of rapidly emerging and constantly evolving threats.  I can’t fault his message – his company paid handsomely for that keynote spot so he can proclaim his new technology as the 2010 silver bullet.  But in my opinion, Salem and Symantec’s new found honesty regarding the efficacy of AV is late, awkward, and does little to provide real leadership to the market.  The industry leaders should not feel all self congratulatory in finally admitting a problem they have ignored for far too long.

I had a similar experience listening to a CEO in denial say something equally late and awkward before at the 1999 Sapphire Conference (SAP user conference) in Philadelphia.  SAP was acting like the World Wide Web was simply not happening all around them because it was so foreign to their core technology.  In his keynote, then SAP CEO (or COB) Hasso Plattner grudgingly referenced the internet as an “emerging technology” but was still ultimately dismissive.  I remember thinking “sir, I think the internet has already emerged and no dismissal from you can change that fact”.  Actually, I think my exact thought was “Emerging? Dude, internet done emerged!”

What confounds me is that companies still somehow either believe or want to believe that companies like Symantec can solve this problem.   Not one person in a company or government agency that fights what has been called the advanced persistent threat tells me that they believe that prevalence technology is a viable solution for what Salem calls “the attacks that we’ve never seen”.  Same with whitelisting, which is the proposed answer for companies like McAfee and Lumension.

(As a complete aside, one vendor actually touted “intelligent whitelisting” at RSA, I assume implying that somehow intelligence had been left out of previous whitelisting attempts.  I could see people everywhere saying “AH! I was supposed to be intelligent about whitelisting!  Now I get it.”)

I think it is disingenuous for companies that have been at the front of the A/V wave to feign public shock that signatures are no longer viable when their own customers have been pleading with them for years and years to step up and make the jump to newer technology.   We of course have been pointing out the problem for some time, with our Worldwide Malware Signature Counter providing a visual for the problem.  I also think it odd that a company like Symantec would post a reports showing that 100% of the enterprises they polled for a recent study had been attacked (see an interesting view of FUD surveys in John Pescatore’s blog here).  The math is simple: if Symantec represents 40% market share and 100% were attacked, aren’t they saying that they failed to protect 40% of the enterprises represented in the survey? Seriously, am I missing something here?

Let me be clear.  The answers to the problem Salem raises do exist.  You and your organization are simply going to have to look outside of your AV suite vendor to find it.


Symantec Quorum – The Carbon Based Life Form Problem

September 22, 2009

I am still a bit baffled by the rush to embrace the reputational aspects of products like Symantec Quorum.  I do get how it works, I do get that it adds value and can help a user see if the application they are loading may be malicious based on its reputational score or lack therefof.

What I don’t get is the protection of the endpoint hinges on a user response.  The demo I saw of Quorum presents a user with a warning screen.  The screen tells them how many people in the Norton community have used the file – few (less than 10), very few, or unknown – and presents the user with three choices:

  1. Decide later (the Scarlett O’Hara I will worry about that tomorrow option)
  2. Remove this file from my system
  3. Run the installation of the product anyway

So essentially the same user that got the endpoint machine into this mess is given a prevalence score and gets a choice of how to proceed.  In my opinion, prevalence protection is a smart idea right up to the reliance on the carbon based life form that clicked on something questionable or outright bad in the first place to now somehow have the wisdom and security awareness to properly respond.  

I am going to have to go with human nature here and guess that they will pick #3 – run the installation anyway.  Because human nature says: “If I clicked on it I want it and I don’t care about your fluffy risk rating”.  I actually think there is a direct correlation behind my claim – the more likely someone is to click on something dangerous, it will be proportionately likely that the same person would ignore any warning and proceed without care.   In other words, the more likely I need to be protected from my own actions, the more likely I will be to ignore the warning and continue on as if nothing had ever happened. 

 That is why I really believe that there has to be automated analysis and remediation behind this technology to really make it practical.  Just one man’s opinion.


My Briefing on Symantec Quorum Part 2 – Why I Think Triumfant Offers a Stronger Solution

July 28, 2009

Yesterday I detailed my impressions after being briefed by Symantec on their new Quorum product.  In summary, I was impressed with the implementation of the technology, but was not convinced that it solves the malware detection gap for enterprise customers, particularly those under the dynamic persistent threat scenario that see precise, well engineered and targeted threats on a continuous basis.

For such customers I believe that Triumfant’s approach to prevalence is far more applicable and practical.  When Triumfant scans an organization’s endpoint population, it builds a rule in the Adaptive Reference Model for every piece of software it discovers, along with information about the files and other elements associated with that software.  In other words, the model builds a functional whitelist that contains prevalence data specific to the organization and not based on the collective wisdom of a community.  And you can build models that address the entire endpoint population, or build models to specific groups of machines as appropriate.  The model is refreshed weekly to ensure that it accurately represents the desired evolution of the endpoint population.

You do not have to tell the model what is acceptable in your specific environment, it learns it.  You can, however, build policies and explicitly define authorized applications through a wizard driven interface.  If there is software already on the machines that ultimately is not in the desired list of authorized applications and programs for the organization, then it is a simple act to build what we call a filter to exclude specific software from the model and therefore the whitelist. 

Once the model is built, any application or program added to an endpoint machine or server that is not in the model as an authorized application is called to the attention of the administrative console.  Resolution Manager synthesizes a situational remediation to remove the application from the machine and ensure that every change to the machine made as part of the installation is reversed.  The remediation can be configured to execute automatically, or be set to require confirmation by an administrator prior to execution.  Either way, no human intervention is required to write the remediation, and every remediation if fully reversible.

Because Triumfant sees all of the changes to the affected machine that were part of the unauthorized software’s installation process, it has the information necessary to build a remediation that removes the malicious code and all collateral elements from the machine.  Why is this important? The installed application could be a trojan horse or be desgned to make configuration changes to weaken the defenses of the machine. So if the install included a secondary malicious payload, Resolution Manager will see it and kill it.  If the install opened a port or changes a security configuration setting, Resolution Manager will see it reverse the process.  

Symantec allows you to build custom alerts based on prevalence data returned from the Symantec reputation database, but from what I saw it does not included automated remediation.  The information I saw from Symantec indicated that it was the role of the client to block a file when an unacceptable reputation score was returned.  Given we can’t teach users to not open suspicious emails or click through social engineering; this would seem to be problematic. And because the application must install for it to be checked by the Symantec product, removal of the suspicious executable and all associated changes to the machine becomes critical. That is why Triumfant would seem to offer a superior solution.

Finally, I would add that the capabilities I describe for Triumfant exist today and are up and working at customer sites – this is not a future. 

I want to take the time again to acknowledge the Symantec team and their willingness to share the details of the product, as well as reiterate my belief that this technology will serve them well in the consumer market.  But for large organizations, I do believe that organization based prevalence is more practical than a community based prevalence.  I also think that Triumfant’s remediation capabilities address a significant shortcoming in the Symantec offering. 

But more importantly, just how much of the detection gap does Symantec expect this to solve? By my calculations, Symantec added approximately 1,700,000 in new signatures in the first half of 2009. More than they added in 2008 total.  That equates to just about 9,000 new signatures a day.  McAfee noted in an entry in their Avert Labs blog that they were writing over 6,000 new signatures a day and they don’t count what is caught by their generic filters and heuristics. Will this catch 10% of the attacks already evading the other protections? 50%?  Unless Symantec thinks this will be a near 100% solution, there would still seem to be a gap.

And that is where Triumfant really stands out: we believe Triumfant closes far more of the gap than any alternative detection and remediation tool.  We would never stand up and say that we close the gap completely, but we think we can make a case that we are pretty darn close.  Because we track all of the changes to each and every endpoint, you would have to be able to construct an attack that does its malicious activity without changing  the attacked machine for Triumfant to not see the attack.  So while prevalence may close part of the gap, why have a gap at all?  And for you folks that are not Symantec customers and like the idea of adding prevalence to your existing protections, we can do that for you and – a lot more – by providing the perfect complement to your antivirus software regardless of the vendor.


My Briefing on Symantec Quorum – Impressed But Not Convinced

July 27, 2009

On July 9 I wrote a post about Symantec’s soon-to-be-released reputation based technology they are currently calling Quorum.  My post was a bit tongue in cheek asking how something unknown could have a reputation, but it appeared to have been taken seriously by the folks at Symantec who pinged me back on Twitter and offered to help me better understand the product and the value of the reputation based approach.  I took them up on the offer and one of their product management folks walked me through the technology.

First let me say that I respect the earnestness and professionalism that the Symantec people had in seeking to correct what they thought were my perceptions of the product.  In return, I will refrain from providing any details of what they shared with me as they are rolling out the product as we speak and I certainly do not want to inadvertently include any information that they have not yet taken public.  I don’t want to damage my reputation score.

What I will share is my general conclusion: which is that while I was impressed with the technology I was not ultimately sold on was the benefit to larger enterprise customers that have to stand against a barrage of precision guided exploits and new attacks on a daily basis. 

The Symantec solution is extremely complete and obviously very thoughtfully constructed.  They have clearly considered a lot of the angles in reputation based technology, including safeguarding against methods to artificially influence reputational scores.  In my opinion, the technology will be a good addition for consumer customers and small businesses that should benefit from reputational comparatives given they have a small number of machines or only one machine to watch.   It also allows Symantec to leverage their large user base as well as integrate and showcase their data storage capabilities to their security customers.  Like I said – in regards to the implementation I was really quite impressed. 

For large enterprises, particularly those customers who are under what we call the dynamic persistent threat scenario, I am not convinced that the prevalence data from a broad community will fill the existing gaps in malware detection. These are organizations that fend off deliberate and precisely targeted attacks designed to extract critical financial data or confidential strategic information by exploiting new attack vectors, recently identified exploitable flaws, or variants of known attacks to evade the traditional defensive software that relies on prior knowledge of attacks for detection.  While these customers might find a community based prevalence score interesting, they frankly are of a profile where such a score – or lack thereof – is not sufficient to make determinations of the potential malicious nature of applications.  The fact that it has been installed in a number of other organizations does not mean that it is acceptable to be installed on their endpoints.

I am grateful to the Symantec team and their willingness to share the details of the product.  I exited the process very confident that while the reputation based technology may help Symantec in the consumer market it has not addressed the shortcomings their tools have in detecting attacks where there is no prior knowledge or the dynamic persistent attacks that many organizations battle on a given day.  In fairness, I am admittedly biased and these shortcomings are not specific to Symantec and are shared by endpoint security vendors as well as their customers. 

Tomorrow I will make my case and detail how I think the Triumfant approach is more applicable and ultimately, more practical.  For example, we already have organization specific prevalence baked into our model.  And we build automated remediations for what we find.  Have a look tomorrow and see if you agree.


McAfee Publishes Numbers On Aggressive Malware Growth

July 24, 2009

McAfee has just posted some number of their own regarding the growth in new attacks (and the subsequent need for new signatures) via a blog post by McAfee Avert Labs.  In that post, McAfee says that the number of new attacks is three times the rate over the same period last year, and that the number of attacks for the first half of the year nearly eclipsed the total for all of 2008. 

We have been leveraging the Symantec numbers for our Worldwide Malware Signature Counter, and it is nice to see that the McAfee numbers back up our basic thesis.  McAfee reports their numbers a bit differently from Symantec, in that McAfee excludes those attacks that were picked up by generic filters and heuristics (much more on that next week).  This makes the McAfee numbers smaller in total, but they represent the same aggressive growth curve as Symantec’ numbers.  For example, if you read between the lines, McAfee saw roughly 500,000 new threats in the first half of 2008, nearly 1,000,000 in the second half, and 1,200,000 in the first half of 2009. 

There has been some interesting new language from the AV vendors regarding the aggressive growth of new attacks and the growing strain to build signatures fast enough to protect their customers. Symantec is trotting out their Quorum whitelist/reputation based technology as the cure, but it remains to be seen if it can really close what these numbers illustrate is a large and growing detection gap.  In shifting the emphasis on the Quorum technology, Symantec is publicly falling on the signature sword.  In the Quorum press release, a Symantec executive is quoted as saying: “Looking at the sheer volume of infected systems in the world, one thing is resoundingly clear: basic security protection is not good enough.” 

Clearly the “elephant in the room” problem has gotten large enough that the AV vendors can no longer act like it is not there.  Because if I interpret the language in this blog post properly, the numbers presented by McAfee are those attacks that fell through all of their nets – signatures, generic filters, and heuristics – at a rate of 6,000 per day.  I do not single out McAfee as I am quite certain that these numbers are representative  just how much is getting through the existing endpoint security defenses of all of the AV vendors, Symantec included.

When you point out a problem - such as the unstustainable nature of the reliance on signatures – publicly the way that Triumfant has done, you draw criticism along the lines of fear mongering or that the sky is falling.  But the McAfee and Symantec research numbers present an objective case and the language of the AV vendors in the press clearly support our position.   Half the problem for us was creating awareness that there was a problem and that it was sizable and growing rapidly. 

We do agree with Symantec in that the IT security market is in need of new thinking and a new approach to counter this growing threat, and we think Triumfant is that new thinking and approach.  Now that the numbers support the story and even the AV vendors are recognizing the problem, we invite you to take the next step and hear what Triumfant has to offer (today, not a future release) as the solution to this problem.  I am willing to go on the line and say that you will at a minimum find it interesting and enlightening and won’t feel like it was wasted time.   We think we have filled the detection gap in a way that is both powerful and elegant, and is already addressing the problem for real customers today. 

What do you have to lose except the exposure to what McAfee says is 6,000 new threats per day?


Symantec’s Reputation Based Detection (Quorum) – How Can Something Unknown Have a Reputation?

July 9, 2009

I am confused. I just read another article about Symantec’s new roadmap and, in particular, their new reputation based product called Quorum.

Symantec has been all over the media touting their reputational based approach as the fix for the signature problem (more on that in a second).  Quorum leverages Norton’s Community Watch program, which essentially collects data from the Norton customers about applications and other things on the Web.  Quorum uses this data to create a reputation score that characterizes the application as good or malicious.  This is integrated with Symantec’s existing signature and behavioral based technologies. 

So here is where I get confused.  A Symantec representative has been quoted as saying that Quorum will offer “much higher detection rates against unknown malware”.  By definition, doesn’t the establishment of a reputation require some knowledge of the person or thing? How can you rely on the collective anecdotal evidence of a community for something that is, using Symantec’s word, unknown?  I have a lot of respect for the folks at Symantec but even they must see the irony in this positioning.

Thousands of machines were simultaneously attacked on July 4 by North Korea or a group sympathetic with North Korea.  Did the malware used in that attack have a “reputation”? This week’s exploits of the Active X flaw in Internet Explorer were previously unknown attacks in the forms of rootkits and Trojan downloaders. Again, it is doubtful that there was any prior reputation. 

It would also be interesting to find out from Symantec how many members of the community must post their reputational opinion to get a statistically relevant sample and therefore eliminate the potential for false positives.  If this number is high, that would indicate a significant number of attacks must be reported before the reputation could be established and therefore used as a preventative.

The bottom line is that while this reputation based technology may offer some additional endpoint protection, it still does not close the gap in traditional defensive software to address unknown attacks.  That is because no matter how you package it, no matter what you call it, the traditional defensive software from the established AV vendors requires prior knowledge of the attack to succeed.  Behavioral analysis, heuristics, and now reputational based protections are an upgrade from signatures, but make no mistake about the fact that they rely heavily on prior knowledge. The bad guys will always have the edge on any software that requires previous knowledge of an attack to detect it as malicious.

It is nice that Symantec is publicly stating that signatures are no longer a sustainable technology, as we have been pointing out with our Worldwide Signature Counter. Reputation based protection may play well in the consumer market, but for businesses and government agencies under the dynamic persistent threat scenario, the announcement by Symantec falls flat. 

As Symantec rolls out their new product line through the summer and into the fall, my guess is that the hype machine for reputation based technology will be running at full throttle.  You can put me down as unimpressed, underwhelmed, and mildly amused at the choice of words.