January 6, 2012 Leave a comment
Today I came face to face with the phishing attack and was able to watch firsthand as the attack worked on the human element of IT security. This morning I contacted by a friend who had received an email that confirmed the purchase of a flight on American Airlines. The friend was now convinced that a credit card had been compromised and that immediate steps were necessary.
Savvy IT security guy that I am, I immediately smelled a rat and asked that my friend (who lives close by) bring the PC with the email to me. After all, I did not want potentially malicious stuff on my machine.
Sure enough, everything about the email spoke of fraud. The appearance and format of the email was not even close to looking like a professional email from a large company that does lots of business online. The email address was suspect, and having been on an airplane or two (or a thousand), I noted that the flight number was not even close to the American Airlines flight numbering system. Lastly, there was the ubiquitous .zip file attached, just waiting to be clicked. An example fo the email can be found on the American Web site here.
What was an interesting study was the reaction of my friend to all of this. I have had a credit card stolen so I knew it was not the end of the world. I also knew that the credit card companies actually handle fraud pretty well, so every second did not really count. My friend was very nervous about the credit card being used to buy all manner of unseemly things all the while laying waste to credit ratings.
But most of all, I noted that the .zip file hung like a ball of yarn in front of an over-caffeinated kitten. My friend so wanted to click on that file. The psychological pull was palatable.
I walked my friend through the process of recognizing such an attack, and went to the American Airlines web page to demonstrate that the flight number on the email did not exist. In fact, it was a digit longer than the field on the site for the flight number status. Next I listened as my friend called American, and then the credit card company. Both verified that no transaction had occurred and that this was part of a wide reaching scheme. The American agent actually spent a lot of time walking my friend through the phishing concept at a high level an provided steps on how to dispose of the email without releasing the malware. I was impressed.
I had several takeaways from the experience. First, while the attack seemed amateurish and hackneyed to me, I was taken by how quickly my friend swallowed the hook and was quickly prepared to react. The simple psychology involved was brutally effective, and I saw why such attacks succeed. If a wide enough net is cast, someone will react the way the bad guys want.
Second, it reinforced the critical nature of the human element in IT security. My friend is bright, educated, and computer savvy. Yet that same person immediately and kinetically reacted to what was a cut-rate phishing attack. People will always be the X-factor in IT security whether it be opening .zip files, shutting off their AV software, or gleefully inserting USB devices from any and every source.
Lastly, the experience screamed for the need for Rapid Detection and Response, because in spite of shields and protections the human factor can be leveraged to bypass or evade those protections. Stuff gets through, and in front of me was a simple example of how.
I have to go, I just received another email from another friend who says he just got a confirmation for a flight to Atlanta he did not buy. Seriously.